

PAKISTAN: VISION AND REALITY
PAST AND FUTURE

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Pakistan: Vision and Reality, Past and Future

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Pakistan emerged on the political map of the world as an independent state on the fourteenth of August, 1947. Notwithstanding its geo-strategic importance as the bridge between South Asia and Central and West Asia, its uniqueness lies in being more than a country and a state — its creation was an effort to change the political map on the basis of an idea and a vision that challenged the dominant liberal secular paradigm of the contemporary state. The Pakistan movement was not just one more liberation struggle against colonial rule (although it was that): it aimed at carving a separate state in territories where the Muslims of India were in a majority as a homeland for Muslim India as a faith-based nation. It was a national struggle for liberation with distinct ideological and civilizational overtones. It challenged two dominant concepts of contemporary politics: Secularism as far as it establishes the principle of the separation of religion and politics; and Territorial Nationalism, which conceptualizes the national identity of a people on the basis of geography and not their faith, world-view and value-framework.

The Pakistan movement was a mass movement that galvanized the entire Muslim community of the Subcontinent — Muslims who were expected to be part of the new state as well as those who knew they would be left out — because it captured a vision that was shared by all.¹ The movement's strength came from a vision that represented the longings of a hundred million people. The success of the political leadership was in giving that vision a definite form, a language that the people understood and a realizable target that became their political destination. Most important of all, it was done at the right moment in the history of the Subcontinent. That is what led to the miraculous achievement of a state within a period of seven years. Time was of the essence. Yet perhaps it was this very fast, even hasty realization of the dream that lies at the root of the tensions, trials and tribulations that have characterized fifty-eight years of Pakistan's turbulent history.

Muslims of the Subcontinent were faced with a unique challenge. They had been the ruling power in India for over eight hundred years. British colonial rulers took power from them in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The religious composition of the population was complex: Muslims constituted only one fourth of the population, the Hindus being in the overwhelming majority. Muslim rulers never tried to change the religious composition of the society by force. While Islam was the religion of those in power and Islamic *Shari'ah* a source of law, other religions and communities flourished without hindrance. Compared with the situation in Europe in the medieval period, which was characterized by religious strife and denominational warfare, India during the Muslim rule presented a model of a harmonious multi-religious and multi-cultural society. There were political wars but not a single instance of mass communal strife, religious inquisition or denominational killing and excommunication. The political and economic landscape was, however, fundamentally changed during the two centuries of the British Raj. Overt and covert discrimination based on religious identities became a matter of policy. A coalition was struck between the British rulers and the Hindu elite with a view to destroying the power base of the Muslims. W. W. Hunter, a British bureaucrat, acknowledges a number of policy initiatives that resulted in this new alliance and the decimation of Muslim power even at the level of the civil society and the economy.² As a part of this emerging power alignment a new class of landlords was created to control and manage agriculture, the mainstream of the economy. Gradually a new bourgeoisie emerged in cities, primarily consisting of Hindu entrepreneurs who acted as the economic arm of the new rulers and become pioneers for industrialization. The traditional system of education was starved of resources and eventually supplanted by a new educational system that favored the new elite and almost decimated the educational base of the Muslim population. The change of the official language and the imposition of the English language as the medium of instruction and communication changed the whole cultural landscape, making the Muslims 'outsiders' in their own lands. In a country where there was one hundred percent literacy among Muslims in late eighteenth century, according to official British gazetteers, the tables were so turned that the educated of yesterday were rendered irrelevant for the new administration and vocations of life. Muslims lagged behind in education to such an extent that in the mid-twentieth century the literacy rate in India in general, and for Muslims in particular, was hardly twenty percent. Those who had received any formal education were not even five percent of the population. Moreover, the thrust of the new educational system was that it produced a new class of people: Indian in race and blood and British in taste and culture, as Lord Macaulay had visualized. So there emerged a class of administrators, both civil and military, who were trained to

act as instruments of colonial rule, yet destined to play an important role in the post-independence era to the detriment of the aspirations of the people. Most important, however, were two critical developments: first, the advent and predominance of the Western European concept of separation of religion and politics and the ever-increasing spell of the ideologies of secularism, capitalism, socialism and the nation-state; and second, the development of quasi-democratic institutions and processes in which power began to gravitate towards the majority community. While Hindu religious revivalism was also an important historic force,³ as has become all the more explicit with the rise of the Hindu Mahasaba, Rashtriya Savak Sangh and latter Bharatya Janta Party, it was the Indian National Congress representing the interests of the Hindu majority that became the champion of secularism, parliamentary democracy and socialism. This, naturally, won for it the ideological affinity of the colonial rulers and the sympathy of other Western powers who stood for the political ideals of post-enlightenment Europe. That is how a new ideological and political nexus was built between the leadership of the Indian National Congress and the British rulers.

Muslims, who had initially thought that they could maintain their distinct ideological culture and political identity within a wider matrix of Hindu-Muslim understanding and common struggle against foreign rule and beyond, realized after thirty five years of vain effort (1906–1940) that this was not possible. They found themselves at a painful crossroads. After years of agonizing reflection, review and debate, they came to the conclusion that they could not preserve and promote their identity in a political system based on composite territorial nationalism wherein decision-making would be in the hands of the majority. Despite its secular and democratic trappings, the Hindu dominated system was not prepared to accept an authentic plurality of religions, cultures and political identities. The issue before Muslim India was not merely seeking freedom from the colonial yoke; they wanted to ensure that the community of Islam was also free to decide its affairs in light of its own value system and socio-political ideals. This is the context in which Muslim political leadership expounded what is known as the Two Nation Theory. While the theory was not new, its application to the situation of Muslim India at a difficult moment in their history was innovative and timely.

The Two Nation Theory unfortunately remains one of the most misunderstood political concepts. It essentially challenged a basic premise of the post-Westphalia political thought, i.e., *nationalism* based on territory and geography. The entire proliferation of nation-states initially in the Western hemisphere and later their expansion to Asia and Africa was a result of this powerful idea of territorial nationalism which subsumed religious, ethnic, linguistic and other identities. The result was a monolithic vision of the state as part of a paradigm of secular democracy.

The Two Nation Theory, while admitting this as one paradigm of polity, affirmed that this is not the only valid paradigm or the one necessarily applicable to all situations. Alternate paradigms also could be equally valid. In contrast to the principle of secularism accepted by the Hindu majority of the Subcontinent, Muslims believed that their religion spells out a different vision of society and state — one that is based on a worldview rooted in the belief in One God (*Tawhid*) and the human need for Divine Revelation as the chief source for guidance, values and norms of behavior for individual and collective life. Integral to the concept of the Two Nation Theory is the principle of plurality of faiths, ideologies, religions, cultures and identities. 'Two' does not simply mean "one plus one" — it signifies the fact that there are two major political streams, one based on faith, religion and divine linkage and another committed to a vision that is exclusively secular and of this world, unrelated to religion and divinely revealed values. Within these two streams there can be many variants.

The centrality of faith and religion in the life of this Muslim community and nation made it imperative for it to search for a political dispensation that was different from the Western model of a secular democratic nation-state. Iqbal, in his Presidential Address of 1930,⁴ clearly expounded the theoretical foundations of this approach and Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his Presidential Address of 1940⁵ spelled out the practical shape this new vision was destined to take.

Iqbal said "The religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore, the construction of a policy on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim."⁶ How this could be actualized in a country where different faith communities exist in sizeable numbers and clear demographic constellations was a challenging question. Iqbal's roadmap for future political restructuring was as follows:

- The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the Qur'an, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behavior, and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreating its whole past as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness.

- Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behavior is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India, is, therefore, perfectly justified.
- I would like to see that Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North West India.⁷

These thoughts constitute important building blocks for the Pakistan Movement. This idea was further developed in the March 23, 1940 Resolution adopted by the Muslim League at Lahore⁸ and finally in the 1946 Resolution of Muslim League Legislators Convention of Delhi.⁹

The political struggle of the Muslims in India had two distinct dimensions, both equally important; first, restoration of Muslim political power in the Subcontinent, at least in that part of it where Muslims are in the majority and as such could enjoy authority to run their own affairs; and secondly, the establishment of a state for Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent where they would be able to practice their religion, promote their culture and civilization, and build a society based on their ideals, values, principles and aspirations. This was the only way to capture political and economic opportunities denied to them under British rule and would have remained denied to them in a political system ruled by the Hindu majority.

Political authority and religio-social identity constitute two crucial and inseparable elements of the idea and vision of Pakistan. There is not a shred of doubt that the leadership of the Pakistan movement committed itself to this vision and the Muslim masses who struggled, sacrificed and suffered to establish the new state were moved, motivated and inspired by this vision and destiny.¹⁰ It is this idea of Pakistan that has sustained the people over the last fifty-eight years and continues to inspire them, despite all the ups and downs in the ideological and political landscape.

The matrix of Pakistani politics cannot be understood without understanding the inescapable link that exists between the religio-ideological and the politico-democratic dimensions. The vision of Pakistan was never that of a theocratic state because Islam has no room for priesthood and holds no brief for a class of humans speaking on behalf of God and being the arbiters between God and man. Islam is a religion based on rule of law, equality

of human beings, governance by *shura* and socio-political justice and accountability for all, rulers and the ruled. The universal values of Islam have been the guiding lights throughout the struggle for independence, not only in the Subcontinent but almost everywhere in the Muslim world.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith captured the spirit of the Pakistan movement in his *Islam in Modern History* when he said: "... the driving force of nationalism has become more and more religious the more the movement has penetrated the masses. Even where the leaders and the form and the ideas of the movement have been nationalistic on a more or less Western pattern, and the substance and the emotions of the followers were significantly Islamic¹¹ ... No Muslim people has evolved a national feeling that has meant loyalty to or even concern for a community transcending the bounds of Islam. ... In the past, only Islam has provided to their people this type of discipline, inspiration and energy¹² ... It is this Islamic notion of the state (quite independent of its focus) that explains the joys and devoted loyalty that it initially aroused. The establishment of Pakistan was greeted by its Muslim citizenry with a resonant enthusiasm, despite the catastrophic terror and chaos of its early months. Indeed without the stamina and morale gathered by religious fervour, the new dominion would hardly have survived the devastation of its first disorder¹³ ... Ideologically it was not a territorial or an economic or a linguistic or even strictly speaking, a national community that was seeking a state, but a religious community. The drive for an Islamic state in India was in 'origin' not a process of which a state sought Islamic-ness but one by which Islam sought a state."¹⁴

The tensions and crises that Pakistan has had to face during the fifty-eight years of its checkered history can be understood and resolved only if political goals and strategies are formulated in light of this psyche of the Muslim people and the ethos of their history. The success of the Pakistan movement was rooted in the formulation of this strategy, and the problems and predicament of Pakistan owe themselves to failures and blunders resulting in neglect, deviations or even occasional abdication on this count.

Fifty-eight years of Pakistani history are characterized by changes and transformations related to two major issues: first, ideological, i.e., the role of Islam's politico-social ideals and the processes for their implementation, and the challenges that beset them from the forces of secularism; and second, the clash and conflict between the forces of democracy and despotism. These two aspects have mostly been examined in the literature as distinct and somewhat autonomous conflict-areas, which has greatly falsified the whole perspective of analysis, diagnosis and prognosis. The fact is that in the Muslim context the two represent two sides of the same coin and not two distinct entities. The ideological and political crisis of the Muslim world in general and of Pakistan in particular, owes itself to this confusion, deliberate or inadvertent. Wilfred

Smith and Filma Northrop are two rare Western analysts who have demonstrated some perception of this Muslim dilemma. Smith, in an interesting yet obscure work¹⁵ not often quoted in Western writings on Pakistan, made the incisive observation: ". . . insofar as an Eastern nation becomes truly democratic, that is, reflecting its own nature, to that extent it becomes un-Western Insofar as Pakistan is really democratic; and not merely superficially so, to that extent it will be Islamic rather than Western."¹⁶ Wilfred Smith thinks that without Islam, democracy is a "useful jargon unworthy of emulation." As such, democracy becomes "an aspect of its Islamicness, a part of the definition of their Islamic state."¹⁷

Filma Northrop, while reviewing the prospects of secular laws in the Muslim world, particularly in the context of Egypt and Turkey, says: "I believe this is one of the reasons why such law (i.e., secular law) usually has to be put in first by a dictator. It cannot come in as a mass movement because the masses are in the old tradition¹⁸ . . ."

Democracy and Islam go hand-in-hand. With the rise of despotism in Pakistan — civil or military — the negation of democracy and fundamental freedoms has coincided with attempts to ignore or run away from Islamic imperatives and the longings and aspirations of the people. Democratization is a stepping-stone to Islamization and fulfillment of Islamic aspirations is possible only through promotion of the democratic process in the history of Pakistan, as also in other Muslim lands. That is why despotism and secularism or socialism have gone together. The recent successes of Islamic forces in Algeria (1992), Pakistan (2002), Egypt (2005) and Palestine (2006) deserve to be understood in this context. Let us examine how this took place in the case of Pakistan and its consequences.

Pakistan had to face problems on three fronts. The British never wanted to divide the country. When they agreed reluctantly and grudgingly to do so, they designed things in such a manner that Pakistan could not survive as an independent state.¹⁹ The last British viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, played a dubious role in this respect. The Congressional leadership, although formally accepting the division of the country and the establishment of Pakistan, never reconciled itself to an independent and prosperous Pakistan. It never even accepted Pakistan as a succeeding power of the Raj in the Subcontinent; it always looked upon it as a seceding power to be regarded an anomaly, even an absurdity bound to collapse in no time.²⁰ The alleged secularism of India and Pakistan's religious identity was also projected as a factor destined to plague relations between the two. The failure of the British to maintain security and law and order, thus unleashing an orgy of communal violence, was the first blow. The period required for transfer of power, originally planned to be nine months as the Muslim League desired (i.e., April 1, 1948), was condensed

into seventy-two days at Congress-Mountbatten's behest (June 3, 1947-August 14, 1947). The division of assets was disrupted and Pakistan never got its share of the legacy, including cash reserves.²¹ The Radcliff award was the most shattering blow, destroying what was left of goodwill for the British and the credibility of its judiciary.²² Now all the evidence has come into the open that the award was politically influenced by Mountbatten and revised at the last moment in favor of India to provide it with access to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The negative attitude of the Indian leadership, from Nehru to the present day, has persisted.

Although Pakistan was accepted as a member of the Commonwealth and the United Nations, it was looked upon with suspicion and apprehension because of its Islamic identity. Nations that claim to stand for democracy have not shown magnanimity towards states and nations that aspire to chart out an ideologically independent course for themselves. Those who refused to succumb to Western concepts of secularism, individualism, liberalism, capitalism, and nationalism were looked upon as odd and abnormal. Prejudice against an Islamic state turned out to be worse. When Christian democratic parties emerged in Europe after World War Two and seized the reins of power, it was acceptable.²³ The anti-communist role of the church was welcomed in Russia and Eastern Europe. Revolutionary theology in South America was also applauded. The creation of an Israeli state on Muslim-Arab lands, despite its pronounced religio-racial character and alleged basis in Jewish historical mythology, was supported with full force.²⁴ But the attitude towards the Islamicity of Pakistan was different — it was overtly inimical. Despite all pleading and back-tracking and even humiliating submissions by secular rulers of Pakistan, civil and military, the prejudice persists.

Pakistan had to face both of these negative factors. But the internal problems were not different. The founding fathers didn't live long enough to build the new state in light of the original vision. Very little real homework was done by the leadership of the Muslim League that led the movement. In the last years of the movement vested interests of all hue and color jumped onto the wagon and tried to manipulate the reins of power. The role of the civil and military bureaucracy, both groomed in Western secular tradition, was dubious, even destructive, as it maneuvered itself into seats of power and disrupted the flowering of the democratic process. The feudal class and the new bourgeoisie colluded with the civil and military bureaucracy.²⁵ The role of external powers, particularly of the U.S. in manipulating political leadership and encouraging military dictatorships, was no less important. This new alliance also tried to move the country towards secularism, away from the vision that inspired the people. The new leadership alienated the people and denied them their democratic rights.²⁶ It tried to seek alliances with secular forces abroad. This

fitted neatly with the new Cold War strategies pursued by the U.S. and the so-called free world.

It was a result of these three major factors that a kind of counter-revolution took place in the country leading to the denial of the democratic process, the containment of Islamic forces, the promotion of vested interests and the perpetuation of the hold of exploiting classes. There was resistance from the people. The Muslim League was routed in the very first provincial elections held in East Pakistan in 1954. The elected Prime Minister and his cabinet were removed by a Bureaucrat-Governor General (1953). The Constituent Assembly was dissolved arbitrarily (1954). Military Rule was imposed, first on a limited scale in 1953 in parts of the Punjab, and then nationwide in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999. East Pakistan was lost, not only because of external aggression, but also because of exploitation, and dictatorial and discriminatory policies that alienated the people of the largest province. I am not disclosing any official secret when I place on record that on the occasion of one of the briefings (1978) as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, I was informed that the Commission had during the Ayub regime undertaken studies which suggested that East Pakistan was a drain on the economy. This was the character and role of the secular-dictatorial regimes that tried to renege on the original vision of Pakistan and saddled Pakistan with successive despotisms. Ethnic tension, political violence, economic exploitation, corruption and bad governance are some of the contributions of these secular westernized regimes.²⁷

The people on the other hand steadfastly remained anchored to the idea of Pakistan. They struggled for their rights. It is no mean achievement that no despotic regime could perpetuate its hold. Every spell of dictatorship was brought to an end through popular democratic resistance. No regime that tried to flout its Islamic identity could persist. All three constitutions contained Islamic provisions, even though most of them have not been implemented. Ayub Khan, under the fiat of martial law, changed the name of the country from "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" to the "Republic of Pakistan" and dropped the Objectives Resolution from the Constitution (1962). But within two years he had to eat his words and bring the Islamic name of the country as well as the Objective Resolution back into the constitution (1964). Mr. Bhutto, as a civilian martial law administrator, tried to change the character of the state to a socialist one (1973), but had to withdraw the draft constitution and finally adopt a consensus document based to a large extent on Islamic and democratic principles. He, despite his secular and socialist protestations, had to introduce a number of symbolic Islamic reforms — like a prohibition of drinking, the closing of dance clubs and the introduction of Friday as a national holiday. It was during his government that the two houses of the

Parliament unanimously adopted the definition of a Muslim that excluded the Ahmadis (1974). All political parties claim to have Islam as their first principle of state policy. As such, Islam, because of the peoples' commitment to it, has never been in dispute, notwithstanding quibbles about different interpretations. While the leaderships have failed to implement the Islamic socio-economic and educational reforms, the vision remains uncompromised. The quality and quantity of literature produced in Pakistan on different aspects of Islamic thought and policy constitute a distinct contribution of the Pakistani nation and a source of inspiration for others. Efforts towards developing political, constitutional, economic and educational concepts of Islam and their application in contemporary society are one of the fruits of the emergence of Pakistan as an Islamic state. A comparative study of the constitutions of Pakistan, Iran and Sudan makes interesting reading, signifying efforts to translate Islamic ideals and values into contemporary constitutional and policy parameters.

The Islamic and democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan and their sacrifices to realize their goals represent the real strength of the ideal and vision of Pakistan and are a pointer to its destiny. Democratization and Islamization are two inseparable dimensions of the same process.

Economically speaking, while Pakistan has not been able to fulfill its real potential, its performance has been remarkable in a number of ways. Muslims of India despite being twenty five percent of the population hardly contributed five to eight percent of its GDP. The economies of the Muslim majority provinces that now make up Pakistan were predominantly agricultural. There were only two industrial mills in the whole of Pakistan in 1947. Despite being the world's major producer of jute, Pakistan had no jute mill on the eve of independence. This area's contribution to Indian industrial production in 1947 was unbelievably low, hardly one percent. In this background what has been achieved during the last fifty-eight years, despite serious failures, missed opportunities, misplaced priorities, and unforgivable neglect of the critical equity dimensions is significant. It was simply unattainable had Muslims not carved out a separate homeland. Even whatever economic progress India has made since 1947 would not have been possible if the Subcontinent remained in a state of civil war between the two largest communities.

Pakistan is one of the few developing countries that have achieved an average growth rate of 5 to 6 percent over a period of six decades. A look at some key indicators gives a general idea of the progress made. Gross domestic product that was only Rs.58 billion in 1947 has increased almost a hundred fold in current prices. Presently Pakistan is world's sixth most populous country and has 44th largest economy in terms of GDP, which using purchasing power parity figures, makes Pakistan the 28th largest economy in the world.

However, with respect to per capita GDP and the Human Development index, its position is palpably poor (164th of 203 nations and 144th out of 190 countries, respectively).²⁸ Failure in the social sector is not due to a lack of resources but to misguided policies and the lack of public participation and accountability as well as over-reliance on policy guidelines given by institutions of global capitalism, such as the World Bank, IMF and consultants trying to transplant Western development strategies onto Third World countries. Main weaknesses and failures of the economy can be traced back to policy blunders. Because of wrong priorities, externally dictated policies, mismanagement and corruption, the benefits of economic growth have not been delivered to the general mass of people. It is the elite that has gained disproportionately at the cost of the common man. The decline in poverty, continuous for three decades (1960's to 1980's), has reversed during the last fifteen years with the result that poverty has increased to one third of the population from a low of 20 percent in late 1980's. Similarly, the trend in income distribution is becoming more skewed in favor of the rich. The state's role in poverty elimination is peripheral. A World Bank study shows that some 28% of poverty eradication programs have been taking place in the private sector, primarily through voluntary Zakat and Sadaqat distributions, which are around Rs.70 billion per year, as against governments budgetary allocations for education and health, which make up hardly 15% of this amount.

Pakistan can ensure a healthy and desirable future, both Islamic and democratic, by tackling a number of important issues. First and foremost, we must deal with the role of the feudal-aristocracy and emerging capitalist classes and the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a few thousand families, which have also built close linkages with the civil and military bureaucracy. This elite has usurped political power and is controlling major areas of the economy. It has become a major barrier to the real transfer of power to the people and their active participation in the economy and polity. As this class is also under the influence of Western political and cultural norms and has been colluding with external powers, the future of democracy and the flowering of the Islamic ethos depend on breaking its hold on power and enabling real empowerment of the people.

The role of the military in politics is also an important issue. It is untrue that there is, or has ever been, any collusion between the military and religious forces.²⁹ The military, like other secular forces, has exploited religion wherever it suited its objectives. Yet all theories of a military-mosque nexus are flawed and fanciful. The military's interventions have mostly been a force towards secularization and as such against the ethos of real Islamization. They also had the backing of Western powers. The military-America nexus is nearer to the reality. Gen Ziaul Haq's role remains dubious, and on the whole negative,

despite some efforts on his part to introduce certain Islamic reforms. The emergence of MMA as a major political player and its clear stand against the Musharraf-U.S. alliance and its commitment to achieve its objectives through the de-militarization of politics and strengthening the parliamentary democracy is a pointer towards the future.

Second, there have been serious flaws in economic strategies and policies and consequent distortions in the allocation of economic resources and the sharing of social benefits and burdens between different strata of society as well as different regions of the country. There is an urgent need to rectify this situation by arranging for a more equitable distribution of benefits of development, positively favoring more deprived regions and sectors of the population.

Third, although Pakistan is a federation, many parts of the constitutional scheme for the distribution and devolution of power towards provinces and local bodies remain unimplemented, giving rise to tensions between provinces and regional groups. The strength of the federation lies not in over-concentration of power at the center, but through ensuring judicious regional autonomy and maximum participation of all regions in decision-making at all levels. This also has been the traditional Islamic model in history. The bureaucratic and military hold over power has come in the way of the proper decentralization of authority. This must occupy an important place in any agenda for the future.

Fourth, a major challenge comes from the neglect of education and human resource development and not enough investment of public and private resources in health care, education, the supply of clean water, and the development of social and physical infrastructure. Massive efforts and resources are needed to develop these neglected sectors of society.

Last but not least is the question of the increasing dependence of the country on the outside world and on foreign and domestic loans to an extent that now almost one fourth of current revenues are consumed by debt-servicing only. Corruption and lack of accountability are other festering sores on the body-politic of Pakistan.

These are serious challenges that confront the country. The next few years are crucial. I see major changes coming, and coming fast. Traditional political parties are losing support. New popular forces are gaining strength, particularly those that have (a) a clear vision of Pakistan's identity; (b) affirm the need to pursue an independent foreign policy, reducing dependence on America and the Western World; and (c) are committed to work for greater self-reliance and solidarity with the Ummah and other countries of the world opposed to the hegemony of one superpower.

Secular agendas and military interventions have failed. They do not hold any promise for the future, which belongs to new political forces that are

emerging. Emphasis must move from constitutional and legal formalism to popular participation in national affairs, more transparent government and a solution to the grass root problems of the people. Internal migration of the population has produced greater homogenization and interdependence between different parts of the country. Based on current economic, social, demographic and political trends, I foresee a Pakistan characterized by voluntary yet most effective cooperation between political forces as much as between the constituent regions seeking greater power, strength and autonomy and striving to achieve shared ideals by utilizing shared opportunities. The people of Pakistan are most conscious, both of their predicament and their prospects. All the indications are that they are bound to learn from their mistakes and resolve to carve out a new future. They have shown great resilience in the past. There is no reason to be despondent about the future.²⁹ As long as the idea and the vision of Pakistan are there to inspire them, their struggle shall continue. It is the idea that has moved them in the past; it is the idea that is destined to move them in the future.

Endnotes

1. To have an idea of the universal feeling of the common people, let me quote an anecdote relating a conversation between two civil servants in Delhi on the eve of the partition. This reflects the mind and soul of Muslim India.

Ali Ashraf, a Muslim civil servant from UP, a Muslim minority province working in Delhi Secretariat, reports his dialogue with a fellow Hindu civil servant from Madras who asked:

"Ali Ashraf! You come from a province where Muslims make up thirteen percent of population but have a political weightage of thirty one percent. Tell me what are you going to gain from Pakistan, other than shrinking back to thirteen percent or even lower?"

Ali Ashraf replied: "You are right in a way. But I would be happy with my predicament if the Muslims of the Subcontinent are able to establish an independent homeland and where they could build their future according to the Islamic ideals and values of Godliness, virtue, justice and welfare. I am prepared to suffer if my brothers and sisters in faith are better off else where."

(See: Husnain Kazmi, *Daily Jang* (1988), reproduced in *Jang International*, London, August 7th 1997, 4).

2. Hunter, W. W. — *The Indian Musalmans*, Calcutta, Comrade Publications, 1945. See also Qureshi, Ishtiaq Hussain, *A short History of Pakistan*, University of Karachi, 1967; Moinul Haq (ed), *History of the Freedom Movement* (4 volumes), Pakistan Historical Society Karachi, 1957–1963) and Thompson, E. W., *History of India*, Mysore, 1908.

3. David Housego, in his article on 'Hinduism' in *The Financial Times* (June 24, 1997) supplement on India: Fifty years of independence Part 1, 10 writes: "A Hindu reformist movement grew up in the late 19th century in parallel with the emerging nationalist movement and the strengthening of separate Hindu and Moslem political identities. The Rashterji Swayamsevah Sangh (RSS) the mother movement of the BJP, was founded in the 1920s to promote Hindu consciousness and identity and concept of Hindu nation . . . Hindu self-assertiveness grew into Pakistan in 1947. It gathered strength in the 1980s fanned by the short-term political exploitation of the issue by Ms. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister and her son Rajiv Gandhi . . . In 1989 Rajiv Gandhi, drawing on the themes of his Hindu nationalist

opponents, opened his campaign by declaring that he would re-establish Ram Rajyi, the mythical utopian kingdom over which Ram, both king and god, is said to have ruled." In December 1992, at the BJP's behest and with the indirect collaboration of Congress and PM Narasima Rao, the historic Babri Mosque was demolished by Hindu activists.

4. *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal* (edited by Latif Ahmad Sherwani) (Lahore, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 5th edition 205), 3–29.
5. *Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam* (Edited by Khurshid Ahmad Kan Yusufi), (Lahore, Bazme Iqbal, vol. II 1996), 1166–1184.
6. *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal* –op. cit. 8.
7. *Ibid.*, 9–11.
8. *Foundation of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents 1906–1947*, (edited by Sharifuddin Pirzada), (Karachi, National Publishing House, 1970, vol. II), 325–347.
9. *Ibid.*, 555–524
10. There are over ninety unequivocal statements of the Quaid-e-Azam, several resolutions of the All India Muslim League and innumerable statements of other leaders of the Pakistan Movement about clear commitment to the Islamic ideals and code of conduct for life and society. The speech of the Quaid on 11th August 1947 is used by a certain lobby out of all context and with utter neglect of other statements and commitments of the Quaid before and after that speech. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan translated the commitment made during the Pakistan Movement into a *grandnorm* for the state of Pakistan by adopting the Objectives Resolution on 12th March, 1949. Nothing could be farther from the truth than the allegation made by some writers that the Islamic ideology as ideology of the state was a concoction of Gen. Ziaul Haq.
11. Smith, W. C., *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957, 75.
12. *ibid.*, 77.
13. *ibid.*, 212.
14. *ibid.*, 214.
15. Smith, W. C., *Pakistan as an Islamic State*, Lahore, Ashraf, 1954.
16. *ibid.*, 50.
17. *ibid.*, 45.
18. Northrop, F. S. C., *In Colloquium on Islamic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1958), 109.
19. *New Encyclopedia Britannica: Macropaedia*, Vol. 25, 403. "British policy, supported by the weight of the Hindu nationalist movement, laboured hard to avoid disrupting the economic and political unity built up during British rule. None of the suggested alternatives to Pakistan commended themselves to Jinnah, whose leadership of the bulk of the community was unchallenged. Without his co-operation — of which price was Pakistan-Indian independence was impracticable. His courage and implacable determination triumphed in the end."
20. While accepting the 3rd June 1947 plan of partition of India, the All India Congress Committee in a resolution adopted on 14 June, 1947 explicitly says: "Geography and the mountains and the seas fashioned India as she is, and no human agency can change that shape or come in the way of its final destiny . . . The AICC earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations will be discredited and discarded by all." Istiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi University, 295. Abul Kalam Azad said: "I am sure it is going to be a short-lived partition" (Quoted by V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Calcutta a, 1957, 384–385). The Hindu Mahasabha expressed the Indian goals more clearly: "India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made integral parts there of"

(Quoted V. P. Menon op. cit., 382). Gandhi himself declared on 15th August 1947 that a time would come when the division would be undone (H. S. Polak, *et al.*, *Mahatma Gandhi*, (London, 1958), 295. V. P. Menon's own judgment was no different: "The partition of August 1947 was surely not intended to tear asunder for all time the ties that for a century and a half have bound India together" Acharya Kriplani, who was the President of the Indian National Congress at the time of the partition called on the Congress party to make India so strong as to get back Pakistan: "Such an India can win back the seceding children to its lap . . . for the freedom we have achieved cannot be complete without the unity of India" (quoted in Brecher, M., *Nehru: A Political Biography*, (Oxford University Press, London, 1959), 378).

21. Economically, the situation seemed almost hopeless; the new frontier cut off Pakistani raw materials from the Indian factories, disrupting industry, commerce and agriculture . . . India remained openly unfriendly; its economic superiority expressed itself in a virtual blockade. The dispute over Kashmir brought the two countries to the verge of war; and India's command over the headwork controlling the water supplies to Pakistan's eastern canal colonies gave it an additional economic weapon. The resulting friction by obstructing the process of sharing the assets inherited from the British Raj (according to plans previously agreed) further handicapped Pakistan" (*New Encyclopedia Britannica*, op. cit., 403.) Field Marshall Auchinleck, Supreme Commander, of the Indian Army, wrote to the British Government, in a report on September 28, 1947: "I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of a Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis . . . The Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers, Council Officials and others have presently tried to obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Force . . . It is becoming increasingly impossible for me and my officers to continue with our task. If we are removed, there is no hope at all of any just division of assets in the shape of moveable stores belonging to the former Indian Army" (Quoted in John Collell, *Auchinleck*, London Cassell., 1959, 920-922).

22. See also Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Chapter 10.

23. See Alexander, E., *Adenauer and the New Germany* (New York, Straus and Cudahy, 1957). Adenauer has restored those fundamental morals and spiritual principles in government and society which are at the root of Christian Civilization and Western history and therefore are among the most powerful factors in the renewal of Europe . . . These Western, Christian, traditions and concept of personal freedom need to be stressed by all political movements. (4-5).

24. See Garaudy, R. *The Case of Israel: A Study of Political Zionism* (London, Shorouk International, 1983); Baker, W. W., *Theft of a Nation* (West Monroe, USA, Jirah Publications, 1989).

25. Kaith Callard, says in *Pakistan: A Political Study*, (George Allen and Unwin, 1957): . . . "There can be little doubt that Jagirdars and Zamindars, Peers and Mirs, Makhdooms, Khans and Nawabs retained vast political influence. A glance through the list of Members of Legislative Assemblies shows how many such hereditary leaders or their near relatives are active in political life" (50).

See also Shahid-ur-Rehman, *Who Owns Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1998); Jalal, Ayesha, *The State of Martial Rule* (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rizavi, Hasin Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-86* (Lahore 1986); Venkataramani, M. S. *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, (New Delhi, 1982), *The American Papers (1965-1973)* (ed. By Roedad Khan) (Oxford University Press, 1999).

26. Smith, W. C., in *Islam in Modern History*, (op. cit., 230) says: "The Westernizing middle class of Pakistan has failed to evolve a successful ideology. It has not succeeded in putting forward in this realm anything winsome and feasible, eliciting the intellectual assent,

noral commitment and constructive energy of its own members. It has not persuaded the masses that the programme on which it has embarked are significantly related to their own convictions, aspirations, as calculated to fulfil their hopes." Callard, K., *In Pakistan: A Political Study*, op. cit., 280 says: "One major difficulty for the politician is that his Western education has set a barrier between him and the common man. And nowhere is this barrier stronger than in the field of mutual understanding of the significance of religion . . . the clamour of some of the politicians and administrators comes very close to Western secularism."

27. Zaidi, S. Akbar, *Issues in Pakistan's Economy* (Oxford University Press, 2004). Dr. Ashraf Hussain, Governor State Bank of Pakistan summarizes the achievements of over five decades of economic transformation in Pakistan in a paper he presented at a conference organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center Washington (Feb 2004). These are:

- A country with 30 million people in 1947 while could not feed itself, yet in 2002 its farmers were not only able to fulfill the domestic needs of wheat, rice, sugar, and milk of 145 million people at a much higher per capita consumption level, but also exported wheat and rice to the rest of the world.
- An average Pakistani earned about \$100 in 1947. In current U.S. dollar terms, the per capita income has expanded more than five-fold and in constant terms three times.
- Agricultural production has risen five times, with cotton attaining a level of more than 10 million bales compared to 1 million bales in 1947. Pakistan has emerged as one of the world's leading exporters of textiles.
- Pakistan hardly had any manufacturing industries in 1947. Five decades later, the manufacturing production index is 12,000, with a base of 100 in 1947. Steel, cement, automobiles, sugar, fertilizer, cloth and vegetable ghee, industrial chemicals, refined petroleum and a variety of other industries manufacture products not only for the domestic market but in many cases for the world market too.
- Per capita electricity generation in 2003 was 10,160 kwh compared to 100 in 1947. Pakistan's vast irrigation network of large storage reservoir and dams, barrages, and link canals constructed during the last five decades has enabled the country to double the area under cultivation to 22 million hectares. Tubewell irrigation provides almost one-third of additional water to supplement canal irrigation.
- The road and highway network in Pakistan spans 250,000 kilometers — more than five times the length inherited in 1947. Modern motorways and super highways and four lane national highways link the entire country along with secondary and territory roads.
- Natural gas was discovered in the country in the 1950s and has been augmented over time. As of now, almost 26 million cubic meter of natural gas is generated, transmitted and distributed for industrial commercial and domestic consumption.
- Private consumption standards have kept pace with the rise in income. There are 30 road vehicles for 1,000 persons in 2001, relative to only one vehicle for the same number of people in 1947. Phone connections per 1,000 persons have raised to 28.6 from 0.4 television sets, which were non-existent, adorn 26.3 out of every 1,000 houses.

Islamization and the Pakistan Economy (edited by Robert M. Hathway and Wilson Lee), (Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2004), 13–14.

28. For a recent exposition of this flawed thesis see: *Haqqani, Hussain, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. (Vanguard Books, Lahore, 2005).

29. Pakistan's record is not without its serious blemishes but to describe it a "failed" or "failing state" is totally unfounded and a violence to history. This is a country that has

successfully withstood serious threats to its existence, security, economy and civil society, that has entered into the fold of middle income countries and has acquired nuclear technology mainly through indigenous effort in the context of obstacles and sanctions from all around. It is destined to face all challenges and play its role in the region and history. It may be worthwhile to quote three American authors who responded to a similar aspersion in their work on *India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years*, sponsored by Woodrow Wilson Center a few years back:

- "In 1826, fifty years after American independence, the new nation is still a work in very uncertain progress. It had not been long since the nation's capital had been sacked by foreign troops. Political campaigns were rife with slander and bribery. Parties and politicians were held in little repute. Outbreaks of violence and mob rule were common in major cities. Border tensions troubled relations with Canada and Mexico. Threats of rebellion and resistance to national policies in the southern states were beginning to confront the government in Washington. Intense debates raged between local interests over economic policies. No one in the country had any social safety net-except to move to the West.
- The label of a potentially "failing state" might easily have been applied to the United States at the end of 1820s as it entered the decades that would conclude with the Civil War. The American experience suggests the importance of caution in making prophecies about the prospects for India and Pakistan on the basis of their first half-century of independence, which ended on August 15, 1997."

India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years, edited by SELIG S. HARRISON, PAUL H. KREISBERG, and DENNIS KUX, (Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington and Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.