FOREWORD

"What is common to all men," surmises a political historian, "is not *more* important but *infinitely more* important than the accidents by which they differ."[1] Yet human history remains a history of humanity's desperate oscillations between seeking identification in the Universal or the particular, between what unites and what divides. Nationalism, symbolising the feeling of belonging to a group distinct from others because of some common racial, linguistic, ethnic and/or historical ties, and usually identified with a particular territory, has been a powerful force for consolidation as well as disintegration particularly during the last two centuries. The break-up of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires in the nineteenth century and the liquidation of British, French, Italian and Spanish colonial empires in the twentieth century bear witness to the 'consolidating' as well as the 'disintegrating' roles of the principle of nationality.

A contemporary historian sums up the dilemma when he says:

"The rise of nationalism has stimulated the crystalization of ethnicity in many parts of the world. Nationalism is the claim of ethnic groups to self-determination. When an ethnic group achieves sovereignty in a certain state, it will become a nation which then excludes the other ethnic groups. The excluded ethnic groups are then forced to get organized and to seek a national minority status and an ethnic autonomy."[2]

And the process of consolidation and disintegration

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keeps on multiplying, like the ever-emerging heads of the hydra. Political maps are made and re-made to suit this ever-changing scenario. Political stability remains an illusion, perhaps a period of calm between a series of storms, or a kind of a breathing space of truce between spells of wars.

A closer look at the political history of mankind reveals that a number of 'pragmatic' strategies have been pursued to 'solve' the ethnic problem. Four such strategies deserve special mention.

First, there has been the strategy of systematic liquidation of other ethnic or national groups. Whether one looks to the cold-blooded extermination of the Muslims from Spain after the victory of the crusaders in the fifteenth century or the systematic liquidation of the Jews in Nazi Germany in the twentieth, or the annihilation of the natives and their cultures in America, Canada and parts of Africa during the hey-day of colonialism in between, one cannot but concede that history is replete with experiments in this strategy. However, human conscience may refuse to accept it as a 'desirable strategy' and however futile it may look with hindsight even as a viable solution to the problem, there has never been shortage of people who have resorted to this strategy time and again.

Second is the strategy of what may be described as structured dominance, where one group so institutionalises its control and authority that its supremacy is established on other groups, who are condemned to live in perpetual dependence. The subjugated people live under unmitigated tension and wait for their opportunity to strike back. The cast system in India, colonialism in Africa and Asia, apparthied in South Africa, Israeli hegemony on Arabs in Palestine are but a few instances in view. But if history is any guide, the strategy of dominance and subjugation can have only a limited span of life. It is impossible to continue it for ever. It contains seeds of its own destruction.

Third is the strategy of assimilation, which consists in conscious policies to seek the dissolution of distinct cultures into some common cultural patterns, resulting over time in dissipating the distinctiveness of the composing units. Secu-

lar democracy and socialist dictatorships both have pursued this strategy with varying degrees of failure. This strategy has been hedged around with assurance of equality and constitutional guarantees for the protection of minorities. In fact, the strategy of assimilation had aimed at effective 'denationalization' of national minorities, and their gradual absorption in the political culture of the majority. This 'ultimate objective' is but another form of liquidation however beautifully presented in the glammer of politics, shorn of all political niceties and terminological ingenuities the real objective remains denial of plurality. This came in sharp focus in disscussions on the status and rights of minorities in the Council of the League of Nations. In the 37th meeting of the Leagues' Council (February, 1926) the representative of Brazil on the Council M. de Mello-Franco said:

"It seems to me obvious that those who conceived this system of protection did not dream creating within certain states of group of inhabitants who would regard themselves as permanently foreign to the general organization of the country . . . . . . (they wanted) gradually to prepare the way for the conditions necessary for the establishment of a complete national unity."

The British representative to the Council, none other than, Sir Austen Chamberlain, endorsed the same view:

"The object of the Minorities Treaties, and of the Council in discharging its duties under them, was, as M. de Mello-Franco has said, to secure for the minorities that measure of protection and justice which would gradually prepare them to be merged in the national community to which they belonged."[3]

Despite the rise of a pseudo-universal technological culture in the West and all the experiments with national democratic politics the problem of a happy equation between the majority and the minorities and real balance between transnational and regional and ethnic dimensions remain unresolved. Western democracies as well as socialist states of Europe are plagued by ethnic, regional, linguistic, religious and cultural minorities, old and new. What is happening today in Kazakhstan, Estonea, Armenia, Azerbijan in the Soviet

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Union, in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe, in West Germany, France, Netherland, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, Canada and America in the non-communist Western world is a reminder that the problem of ethno-nationalism remains unsolved despite the socialist or secular democratic political frameworks, which may otherwise have many other achievements to their credit. *The Economist* (September 17, 1988, p. 57) succinctly observes that "a spectre is haunting the communist half of Europe — one that communism thought it had laid to rest, the passions of nationalism, whether it comes from Estonians (0.4% of the Soviet Union population) or Serbs (36% of Yugoslaves), the challenge is severe." But the spectre is not haunting the communist half of Europe alone — it is haunting the whole of Europe and the Western World.

Finally, there has been the conscociational strategy adopted by multi-national states like Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Yugoslavia, Canada, Nigeria, etc. The experiment of 'state of nationalities' wherein ethnic groups, while remaining distinct, were tied to a state machinery by a network of interests and institutions hoping to represent an 'association between equals', after working for some time, is again in trouble.

II

Islam has adopted a unique approach to the solution of this problem. It provides a *new basis* for the organization of human society and an equity-based framework for the flourishing of a united yet diversified and genuinely pluralistic society. It establishes its social organisation on a faith and ideology that is universal and open to all, ensuring equal opportunities for attaining the most sublime, morally, spiritually and materially and is also tolerant enough to accept those who refuse to join its ideological fold. Within the Islamic community and between the Islamic community and other communities and nationalities it refuses to impose a strategy of forced similarity. Instead it pursues the path of unity in diversity, equality alongside acceptances of differences as genuine and authentic.

Tawhid (the principle of Oneness of God) is the bed-rock of the Islamic social order. It affirms that all men are creatures of One God — they are all equal and subject to the same laws of spiritual and social development. Distinctions of colour, class, race, language and territory, real as they are, are good only for knowing each other, and not as the basis for social identification and the criteria for excellence, moral or material. Humanity is one single family of God, all men and women belong to one fraternity, they are respectable as *humans*. And excellence lies in achieving heights of virtue, piety, God-consciousness and service to mankind in a framework of freedom and completion where all have equal opportunities for seeking the most sublimes. The Quran says in categorical terms that:

"O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is the most deeply conscious and heedful of Him. Behold, God is al-Knowing, all-Aware."[4]

This is the first charter of human equality. All human beings are like one family, without any inherent superiority of one over another based on race, blood, colour, ethnicity or otherwise. Islam emphasises the *essential oneness* of human beings underlying their apparent differentiations, with the result that while differences are not ignored, racial, tribal, national or linguistic prejudice is avoided. In fact, boastings and claims of superiority based on national or tribal prejudice *('asabiyyah)* have been condemned by the prophet (peace be upon him) as "pagan ignorance" *(Jahiliyyah)*. The prophet said: "Man is but a God-conscious believer or an unfortunate sinner. All people are children of Adam, and Adam was made out of clay."[5] The Prophet (peace be upon him) is also reported to have said: "He is not of us who proclaims the cause of tribal partisanship *('asabiyyah);* and he is not of us who fights in the cause of tribal partisanship."[6] When asked to explain 'tribal partisanship' *('asabiyyah)* the Prophet answered, "It means helping their own people in an unjust cause."[7] On the occasion of his last pilgrimage the Prophet

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(peace be upon him) declared:

"Your blood and your property are sacrosanct until you meet your Lord and He will ask you of your deeds . . . . . . Know that every Muslim is another Muslims' brother, and that the Muslims are brethren unto each other. It is only lawful to take from a brother what he gives you willingly, so wrong not yourselves."[8]

Islam does not deny differences based on language, ethnicity, culture, race or colour. Instead it accepts and accommodates them under the umbrella of a higher principle of identification and social organization based on faith and moral excellence; with the result that a universal basis is provided for societal organisation and a moral path opened up for human evolution. Islam does not stand for an artificial uniformity, it affirms the principle of unity in diversity — a unity based on a common ideal, an agreed criterion for moral excellence, a mission that harnesses all and sundry in the service of virtue and equity, a law that ensures equality and justice and a social organization that admits of variety within the framework of a common fraternity.

Iqbal sums up this strategy of Islam when he says:

"Islam is not earth-bound. It aims at shaping a human society by the co-mingling of races and nationalities so that an Ummah with a specific self-consciousness may emerge."[9]

Ismail al-Faruqi, highlighting the spirit of the Islamic culture and its historical ethos says:

"On the front of social ethics, Islam rejected the tribe as the limit of security and social cohesion, Makkan inequality and class distinctions. . . . . . It upheld a universal *pax Islamica* based on the equal rights of all persons and races and expanded the tribalist cohesiveness to include the universal community . . . . . The life of society was no more dependent upon inter-tribal treaties or a strategic balance of power but upon public law, both within the Muslim community and the Islamic state and without. It was the greatest innovation in international relations not only to found them on law but to recognize not only the states as subjects thereof but

the individuals as well. Islam gave the state, as it did the person, a new sense of mission and a new dignity. It emphasized the power of government to rule — the more the better — and demanded obedience and advice from the citizens as long as all are subject to public as well as the moral law. Islam protected the citizen, Muslim and non-Muslim, the latter by granting him the freedom to govern his life by his own Jewish or Christian law as exercised by his peers, and the former by making heretication virtually impossible, there being no ecclesiastic *megisterium* to pronounce on Islamicity except the consensus of the *Ummah* across the generations. Islam sought and made a society in which ideas could travel and contend without hinderance and in which the best argument could and did win."[10]

Wilfred C. Smith, while discussing the worldly success of Islam says:

"The success, moreover, was religious. The Muslim achievement was seen as intrinsic to their faith. They were not only victorious on the battle-fields and effective in many diverse departments of living, but they succeeded also, and again in a relatively short period of time, in integrating life into that wholeness that constitute a culture. Many elements went into the making of Islamic civilization: elements from Arabia, from Hellenism, from the Semetic cultures of the ancient North East, from Sasani Iran, from India. The achievement of the Muslims was that they welded these into a homogeneous way of life and also carried it forward into new developments. And it was Islam that provided the integration, as it provided too the drive and power to sustain it. Islamic form was given to almost every aspect of life, whatever its content. And it was an Islamic pattern that gave the society cohesion as well as vitality. The centre of this unifying force was religious law, which regulated within its powerful and precise sweep everything from prayer rites to property rights. The law gave unity to Islamic society, from Cordoba to Multan. It gave unity also to the individual Muslim, his entire life

activity being organised into a meaningful whole by this divine pattern. It gave unity also in time, providing the community with continuity, as dynasties rose and fell and could be regarded as episodes in the persisting enterprise of Islamic endeavour to build on earth the kind of social order that the divine importance prescribes."[11]

G. E. Von Grunebaum looks upon the phenomenon of Islam slightly differently, yet succinctly highlighting the spiritual unity emerging from the mosaic of Islamic civilization, giving new meaning to the diversity of colours, forms and patterns:

"The casual outlooker is struck by the picturesque uniformity of Islamic civilization. Individual objects as well as entire cities appear to speak of the same *Formensprache*, most clearly symbolized by the sinerous intricacies of the Arabic script, the foreignness of it also being emphasised and protected by a difficult and puzzling language. Gradually, the student becomes aware of the inexhaustible diversity hiding behind the colourful veil, and he perceives the national and the regional elements. Further analysis reveals the alien provenience of much that looked indigenous; still, in the end, the most careful investigation will have to testify to that unity in the spiritual structure and that amazing power of adaptation that will present the foreign borrowing, hardly recognizable, in native garb. More and more we have come to discover non-Arab or non-Islamic elements in the framework of this civilization . . . . . The evolution of Muhammad's preaching with its comparatively poor background of Arabian civilization into the cultural system of Islam with its claim to universal validity, forcefully colouring with its own and unmistakable patina every single object appropriated and every single thought accepted, is one of the most fascinating spectacles history presents. The centre of this system is religion."[12]

The Islamic model ensures justice for all, those who join the fold of Islam and become part of the Islamic Ummah, and also for those who remain outside its fold, and as such are accepted as part of a wider family of nations or religions

and cultural communities. The Constitution of Madinite state established in the first year of hijra provided for a state of communities, fortified by rule of law and freedom of religious and cultural plurality. It established an ideological state; yet open to all and committed to justice to all its citizens, whatever be their religion, race or colour. This approach was no different from the dominant approaches of the time, or for that matter of the ones that have fashioned the fate of mankind in the contemporary world, that Christians of the Jordan Valley preferred the rule of the Muslims to the rule of their own co-religionists. T. W. Arnold records in *The Preaching of Islam* that the Christian inhabitants of the valley of Jordan wrote to Abu 'Ubaidah, the leader of the Muslim Army that

> " 'O Muslims, we prefer you to the Byzantines though they are of our own faith, because you keep better faith with us, and your rule over us is better than theirs, for they have robbed us of goods and our home.' The people of Amessa closed the gates of their city against the army of Herculius and told the Muslims that they preferred their government and justice to the injustice and oppression of the Greeks."[13]

Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer, a leading Hindu thinker, writes:

> "What does Islam stand for? I regard and all thinking men recognize Islam as the one and only democratic faith that is actually functioning in the world today. Being a Hindu, firmly entrenched in the Hindu faith, I yet make bold to say so. My own religion has not succeeded despite its fundamental philosophy, in implementing in practice the *oneness of humanity*. No other religion, whatever its theory may be, has brought into practice the essential idea of oneness of men before God as Islam has done. It is only in Islam that there can be no such problem as those presented by the Boers in South Africa, as those prevalent in White Australia or in the Southern States of the United States of America or even in England among the several strata of society."[14]

Arnold Toynbee, reflecting on the historic failure of the West, as against the undisputable success of Islam in facing

the challenge of race and ethnicity, says in *Civilization on Trial:*

"Two conspicuous sources of danger in the present relation of this cosmopolitan proletariate with the dominant element in our modern Western society are race-consciousness and alcohol; and in the struggle against each of these evils the Islamic spirit has a service to render which might prove, if it were accepted, to be of high moral and social value. The extinction of race consciousness as between Muslims is one of the outstanding moral achievements of Islam, and in the contemporary world there is as it happens, a crying need for the propagation of this Islamic virtue. It is conceivable that the spirit of Islam might be the timely reinforcement which would decide this issue in favour of tolerance and peace."[15]

It may be worthwhile, in this context, to refer to the Millet system which was developed by the Ottomans to ensure the religious, political and cultural rights and the preservation of the religio-cultural identity of non-Muslim communities living in their realm. Let us quote Prof. Macartney, who has compared the peace and tranquility that was enjoyed by minorities in the Ottoman empire with the persecution and inequity to which cultural and ethnic minorities have been exposed to in Europe.

"Out of this principle developed the well-known Turkish Millet system. . . . . It was ultimately extended to embrace all the larger communities . . . . . The millets came to comprise, besides the Islamic community (which was to all intents and purposes a Millet, although technically not described as such, and embraced all Muslims, of whatever race and language), the Millet-i-Rum (the Greek) . . . . . Ermani (Gregorian Armenians), Musavi (the Jews) and Prodestan (Protestants)". The Bulgarians became a separate Millet in 1870. The Serbs had been one from 1557 to 1766.[16]

"These Millets enjoyed very wide freedom. The head of each, the Millet-Bashy, was accredited to the Sublime Porte, and wielded not only ecclesiastical but also some civil author-

ity. His community enjoyed entire autonomy in religious and scholastic matters and a measure of communal autonomy. The Millet-Bashy registered the births, marriages, and wills of his flock, maintained law courts to decide cases of personal status as between them, and even to deal with ordinary civil legislation between two members of the same Millet and raised taxes for these purposes.

"It is hardly necessary to add that the Turks made no attempt whatever to eradicate the language of their subject nations. On the other hand, the more sophisticated Greeks, especially in the nineteenth century spared no pains to destroy the literature, historical records, and other national monuments of their fellow-Christians, and particularly of the Bulgarians, with disastrous results for modern scholars.

". . . . During the earlier golden age of Turkish conquest the Turks were far less harsh masters than the Christians. There are many cases on record of communities which had fled before the invader, returning voluntarily to place themselves under his rule. In 1454 a German Jew actually wrote to the congregations of Syria, Rhineland, Moravia, and Hungary inviting them to emigrate to Turkey . . . . He wrote: 'Brothers and teachers, I, Isaac Zarfati, proclaim to you that Turkey is a land where nothing is lacking . . . . The way to Holy Land lies open to you through Turkey. Is it not better to live under Muslims than under Christians? Here every man may dwell at peace under his own vine and his own fig-tree."

". . . . . They (the Turks often) allowed the non-Muslim nationalities to establish themselves in a singularly favourable position. Commerce, banking and industry, not to mention arts and letters, were entirely in non-Turkish hands throughout the Ottoman Empire. Even in administration non-Turks often played a very important part. The Dragomans of the Porte and Fleet, throughout the eighteenth century, were invariably Greeks."[17]

Whether one looks to the regional and ethnic diversity that existed within the integrated mosaic of the Muslim community, or wider matrix of the Islamic state ensuring equality before law and religio-cultural plurality to non-Muslim communities living within the Islamic realm, one is struck by the

unique approach adopted by Islam in maintaining unity without eliminating variety.

III

If this has been the Muslim record in history, what has gone wrong with the experiment in Pakistan wherein, despite examplary unity demonstrated during the Pakistan movement (1940—47), the nascent state could not come to terms with the problems of ethno-nationalism.

There can hardly be two opinions that the question of ethno-nationalism has moved to the centre-stage of Pakistani polity in the recent years. The news about ethnic conflicts among various groups frequently dominate the national media; several regional leaders openly talk of their secessionist or near-secessionist designs; organizations with regionalist causes continue to proliferate in the provinces and an increasing spiral of ethnic violence appears to have engulfed the Pakistani society, at least in certain parts of the country. Are we moving towards a Hobbesian 'state of nature', where a 'war of all against all' is in the offing with disastrous consequences for the country? What has gone wrong? Why have the ethnic groups begun to demand a nationality status? What is the nature of their ideologies? What strategies do they pursue? What is the nature of their organizations? Where does their leadership come from? What strata of society do they mobilize? What role do the international factors play in this situation? In short, what domestic and international factors are important in understanding the politics of ethno-nationalism in Pakistan?

These questions deserve to be probed in depth, both from ideological and conceptual as well as pragmatic and historical perspectives. Dr. Tahir Amin, a young Pakistani scholar, who has already made his mark by his perceptive study on the Afghanistan crisis,[18] has now addressed himself to some of these questions. The present study is the result of painstaking and sustained research, in-depth analysis of trends and movements and systematic evaluation of concepts and theories commonly invoked to explain the phenomenon

of ethno-nationalism in contemporary literature. Dr. Tahir Amin has spent over a decade on this project, which was completed in MIT this year and on which he got a well-deserved Ph. D. One may differ with him on a point here or surmise there, but I have no doubt in saying that Dr. Tahir Amin has produced a brilliant piece of research on an area Pakistani scholars and statesmen in particular and the contemporary analysts in general cannot afford to ignore. His carefully research study and his penetrating analysis of the literature on ethno-nationalism and of the strategies pursued in the past are a seminal contribution to the understanding of a problem whose significance is not merely theoretical.

To the best of my knowledge this is the first indepth and systematic analysis of post-1971 Pakistani ethno-national movements. Specifically, this study focusses on the three movements: (1) the Jeeya Sind movement, (2) the Baluch movement; and (3) the Pushtunistan movement. The author has argued that the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements have risen in strength overtime, making Sind and Baluchistan as the two most volatile provinces of Pakistan, while the Pushtunistan movement of the NWFP, which was a powerful movement in the early days of Pakistan, has declined, particularly and decisively in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The explanation for the rise of the first two and the decline of last mentioned movement, in author's view, lies in a combination of domestic and international factors.

Among the domestic factors, it is argued that the policy of the Pakistani governments has primarily been instrumental in the rise of the Jeeya Sind and the Baluch movements and the decline of the Pushtunistan movment. It is due to the failure of the state to evolve a just political system which should guarantee a fair participation to all the ethnic groups in the society. The groups left out of the system have revolted not only against the unjust political arrangement but also against the state itself, which is looked upon as the initiator and protector of the system.

With the informal take-over of the power by the military-bureaucratic structure in 1953 in Pakistan, the composi-

tion of the decision-making elite was such that the Punjabis, the Mohajirs and the Pushtuns dominated the top echelon of the power elite while the Sindhis, the Baluchis (and also the Bengalis) remained less effective. The Military-bureaucratic elite pursued certain political, economic and cultural policies which on the one hand failed to integrate the people into one ideological community and on the other generated and fed ethno-national tendencies in Sind, Baluchistan and East Pakistan. Especially, the policies pursued during the Ayub era (1957 – 1969) and re-incarnated in the Zia era (1977 – 1988) bear a remarkable similarity to each other in terms of content as well as their consequences. Both regimes favoured some version of 'controlled deomcracy' model in political sphere, both considered economic development as the panacea to the ethnic problems, and both attempted to impose unitary cultural policies and administrative structure though under different slogans. The consequences of the policies were quite similar in the case of Sind and Baluchistan.

Ethno-national cultures were born in Ayub era and were matured during the Zia era. The political role of the unrepresentative military-bureaucratic elite, in the author's view, proved the canker of the national life, the real inner disease, which has stirred the ethnic pot boiling in Sind and Baluchistan. However, the unintended consequences of the policy has been that the Pushtunistan movement declined over time, because of greater share of the Pushtuns among the top military-bureaucratic elite. Interestingly this Pushtun elite came especially from those areas of the NWFP which had constituted the mass-base of the Pushtunistan movement.

International factors have reinforced the trends generated by the domestic factors. India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union took an active interest in the Pushtunistan movement. However, despite their explicit support, Delhi-Kabul-Moscow axis was unable to check the declining popularity of the Pushtunistan movement. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in Dec. 1979 dramatically hastened the process of decline of the Pushtunistan movement. The pro-Moscow Pakistani Pushtun leaders found themselves in an odd situation of supporting the Soviet

Union against the millions of their own Pushtun brethren who had to leave Afghanistan as a consequence of the Soviet action. On the other hand, consequences of the policies of successive Pakistani regimes in Sind and Baluchistan offered India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union a ready-made opportunity to further complicate the situation in the two provinces. Now when the heroic struggle of the Afghan Mujahideen has forced the Soviet Union to militarily withdraw from Afghanistan and the signs are emerging that with the formation of Islamic republic of Afghanistan, Kabul may permanently drop out of Delhi-Kabul-Moscow chain, a new regional situation will emerge in South Asia. Will India and the Soviet Union enhance their covert activities in Sind and Baluchistan? What would be the role of the United States of America, some of whose scholars have displayed covert interest in the ethno-national movements of Baluchistan and Sind? It is difficult to answer these questions conclusively at this time but Russia and India both have their reasons, motives and a history of joint collaboration against Pakistan in the past. Their role in East Pakistan crisis of 1971 is not forgotten and a future possibility of similar role may not be ruled out if the domestic political situation in Sind or Baluchistan worsens. The role of America also remains intriguing, in certain respects.

This study brings into light the dynamic nature of the phenomena of ethno-nationalism, rising and declining in response to a combination of domestic and international factors and forcefully challenges the assumptions of various writers and policy-makers alike who consider ethnicity as a given, static and objective attribute of various groups bound to be politicized with the passage of time. This perspective suggests that the policy of the state is the primary factor in changing the course of these movements. If the state evolves a mechanism of sharing power with all the ethnic groups, the ethno-national movements are bound to decline. In the absence of power-sharing arrangement the movements are likely to rise.

This study also challenges another widely held assumption of the Pakistani decision-makers and intellectuals that

economic development of backward areas *per se* is going to resolve ethnic tensions. In fact, on the contrary, the argument advanced here is that economic development, in the absence of participatory political system, is likely to fuel the ethnic sentiments further, leading to counter-productive results.

Why has Pakistan failed to evolve a participatory political system? At one level, explanation lies in the institutional imbalance between the weak political parties and strong civilian-military bureaucracies (with their structural links to the West) inherited from the colonial era. The civilian-military bureaucracies have dominated the Pakistani political scene with disastrous consequences for the integrity and solidarity of the country. They not only hindered the growth of the participatory political system but also intendedly or unintendedly, have encouraged the regionalist and secessionist tendencies. At another level, the failure to evolve a participatory system lies in the Pakistani society which has not followed anyone ideological framework in its national life in its true spirits. Notwithstanding lip-service to Islam, no serious effort was made to develop Pakistan into an Islamic democratic state. In different periods of its history, the successive Pakistani regimes have drawn their legitimacy from different ideologies, liberalism (1947 – 1970), Socialism (1971 – 1977) and Islam (1977 – 88). Although Pakistan was formed in the name of Islam in 1947 but none of the regimes has so far made the establishment of a just Islamic society as its real objective. Even those who have talked loudly about Islam have done precious little to establish the Islamic law and ethics and to pursue political, economic, social and educational policies based on the values and principles of Islam. Islam as a real basis for actual policies, and Islam as a cover for policies based on secular strategies are poles apart. One must not be confused with the other. One of the central thesis of this study is that the real unity among the Pakistani masses can be achieved only when a participatory political system based on Islamic justice is formed in this country. None of the other ideologies can have similar unity potential.

Although the focus of this study is not on the examination of alternative policies, yet three main points deserve consideration from the policy perspective.

First, the survival, strength and solidarity of Pakistan depend on serious, sincere and sustained efforts towards the strengthening of the Islamic ideological framework. It is only with the establishment and growth of a just and participatory Islamic political system that a real unity among the masses can be achieved.

Secondly, state institutions like the army and bureaucracy deserve to be restructured so as to make them both nationally representative as well as Islamic in their character and behaviour.

Thirdly, genuine and just grievances of ethnic groups be redressed so as to remove causes of ethnic tensions, provide equal opportunities to all not only to seek redress of their grievances but to strive to achieve the highest positions in the society and genuinely feel that they have a say in the processes of decision making and national accountability. If a creative response to the challenge can be formulated on the above lines the situation, however, serious and disturbing is not beyond repair.

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Islamabad
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